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The difficulty in considering Duple is that the court is apparently at-
tempting to establish its own due process standard for personal jurisdiction
in an international trade situation. It has been held in interstate trade situa-
tions that an alleged tortious act will suffice as "contacts" for due process.'
It has also been held that there must be sufficient minimum contacts
in addition to the commission of the act, and some courts have viewed the
foreseeability of injury in the forum state as sufficient to meet this addi-
tional requirement.' The court in Duple looked at the alleged tortious act
and said it was not enough for due process. It is unclear, however, exactly
how much more is required. In Duple actual knowledge of the product's
destination was shown, and was held to be "sufficient contact." But the
court, in reaching its conclusion, cited several cases where the mere showing
of the foreseeability of the product's presence in the forum state was
sufficient. The language of the opinion leaves it unclear whether this court
would follow the foreseeability test in an international trade case where
actual knowledge was lacking.
It is not clear why neither of the rules accepted in cases cited by the
court was deemed sufficient in Duple. Although the court claimed it was
not concerned with the likelihood of enforcement of the judgment in Eng-
land, it would seem that attempting to enhance the possibility of such
enforcement is the only justification for the court's holding. It does not
appear to be at all practical in determining jurisdiction in general situations.
But there is at least a possibility that a stronger basis for claiming jurisdic-
tion will increase the likelihood of a decision on the merits being accepted
by the foreign courts.
Richard D. Pullman
An Over-Extension of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction:
Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
Bryan and Hatridge were injured when the bus in which they were rid-
ing overturned. The owner of the bus, a construction company, carried a
comprehensive liability insurance policy with Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company. In a state court, Hatridge obtained a default judgment against
the driver for $50,000, and his wife obtained a judgment for loss of con-
sortium' in the amount of $10,000. Subsequently, Mrs. Hatridge instituted
an action against Aetna in a state court to recover on her default judgment.
Although her judgment was in the amount of $10,000, she expressly waived
" 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL 'PRACTICE 5 4.41-1[3], at 1291.57-.58 (2d ed. 1967); see Nelson v.
Miller, I1 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), cited in Duple, 417 F.2d at 234.
" See J. MOORE, note 35 supra. See also notes 22-26 supra, and accompanying text.
'Consortium is the "[c]onjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the
company, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 382 (4th ed. 1951).
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all rights to recover any amount in excess of $9,999.99. 2 Aetna removed
Mrs. Hatridge's action to federal district court and joined Mr. Hatridge
as a third party defendant! Thereafter, Aetna brought an action in the
same federal court seeking a declaratory judgment of its rights under the
insurance policy. This and the action of Mrs. Hatridge were, by consent,
heard together. The court granted summary judgment to Aetna4 after the
Hatridges conceded that any decision by the federal district court would be
controlled by an earlier federal court decision which denied recovery to
Bryan and his wife against Aetna.' Desiring to have a state court pass on
the substantive issues, Mrs. Hatridge moved to remand the action which
she had instituted. Her motion was denied. Appealing to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Mrs. Hatridge contended that her action
should have been remanded to a state court because her claim did not sat-
isfy the jurisdictional amount required for actions in federal court.7 Held,
affirmed: A claim which does not involve the "amount in controversy" re-
quired for actions in federal court, but which is derivative of a primary
claim meeting that requirement, may be maintained under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction, because, where two claims are intertwined and inter-
dependent, federal jurisdiction of the primary claim will appropriately
promote and support federal jurisdiction of the other. Hatridge v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PENDENT JURISDICTION
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is essentially a judicial response to
problems created by the existence of parallel state and federal remedies for
the violation of the same legal rights! This concept was occasioned by a
desire for judicial economy and the convenience of litigants, as well as by
a consideration of potential res judicata problems.! The basis for the doc-
trine can be traced to the decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.0
2 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964) states that federal jurisdiction may be invoked "where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 .... "
' Mr. Reid, the bus driver, was also joined as a third-party defendant.4 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hatridge, 282 F. Supp. 604 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
2 Bryan and his wife were denied recovery against Aetna by a federal district court in an action
brought to recover the amount of a prior default judgment obtained against the driver in a state
court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that Bryan was in the
course of employment with the construction company at the time of the accident, and therefore
he fell within a definitional exclusion in the insurance policy applying to employees injured by
other employees during the course of employment. Bryan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 872
(8th Cir. 1967).
6 Presumably, Mr. Hatridge's relationship to the construction company at the time of the acci-
dent was the same as that of Mr. Bryan. Therefore, Mrs. Hatridge desired to stay away from the
federal court where precedent had been established by the Bryan decision. See note 5 supra.
See note 2 supra, and accompanying text.
'Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Conurts,
62 COLuM. L. REV. 1018 (1962).
9 Musher Foundation Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 641 (1942). The res judicata problems are those caused by the rule that the finality of a
judgment extends to all issues that could have been litigated.
'06 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251 (1824). Osborn concerned the taxation of a national bank under an
act passed by the state of Ohio. The bank brought suit to enjoin the state auditor, Osborn, from
collecting the tax, alleging its unconstitutionality. The injunction was violated and in a separate
action brought by the bank, Osborn argued that the state was the real party in interest and there-
fore the federal court lacked jurisdiction.
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In that case Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observed that "when a question
to which the judicial power is extended by the Constitution is an element
of the original cause, Congress has the power to give the federal courts
jurisdiction over the whole cause even though some non-federal questions
of fact or law may be involved . . . ."" Chief Justice Marshall based his
statement on the theory that the grant of federal jurisdiction "to all cases
arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States"'
contemplates and authorizes adjudication of any non-federal issues neces-
sary to the resolution of a federal claim." This theory presumes that a court
of original jurisdiction could not function unless it has power to decide all
of the issues present in the case."
The Supreme Court in Siler v. Louisville &, Nashville Railroad5 relied
heavily on the Osborn doctrine. In Siler the plaintiff was entitled to sub-
stantially the same relief under both state and federal laws. The Court
found that both claims appropriately could be heard in federal court, ob-
serving that once a court properly obtains jurisdiction over federal ques-
tions, it has the right to decide all questions in the case. Significantly, the
court determined that the case was to be controlled by local or state ques-
tions alone, and it was immaterial that the federal questions might be
decided adversely to the party raising them, or that they might not be
decided at all.1"
In Hurn v. Oursler" the Court further relied on the Osborn decision,
but extended it to situations where procedural convenience was the sole
ground for justifying decisions of state issues.' In Hum both a federal and
non-federal claim were based on the same allegations of fact. Following
Siler, the Court found that federal jurisdiction over the federal claim pro-
vided jurisdiction for the state claim. The Court held that the district court
was not under a duty to grant jurisdiction over the non-federal claim, but
it was within its discretion to do so.'9 However, the Court made clear that
a federal court may not assume jurisdiction of a separate and non-federal
cause of action simply because it is joined in the complaint. In doing so,
the Court recognized the difference between "a case where two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which
presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct
causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal in character.""
The Hurn test was discarded by the Supreme Court in United Mine
'lId. at 257.
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
"Note, supra note 8, at 1020.
'
4 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 63 (2d ed. 1970).
15213 U.S. 175 (1909). In Siler the plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state
railroad commission's rate order, asserting that the controlling statute violated the federal con-
stitution because the rates were so low as to be confiscatory, and that the state commission had
no power to make such an order under the proper construction of the controlling state statute.
1Id. at 191.
17289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 56.




Workers v. Gibbs."1 There the Court held that pendent jurisdiction exists
over a non-federal claim when a federal claim exists and the two have a
relationship indicating that the entire action comprises one constitutional
"case." Pendent jurisdiction is present whenever the state and federal
claims are derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact,"-i.e., if the
claims are such that the plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding."" The Hum test seemingly was dis-
carded because of its dependence on the unclear "cause of action" termi-
nology." Hence, in pendent jurisdiction situations, the Supreme Court no
longer emphasizes the similarity of facts alleged in two claims, but rather,
under Gibbs, determines whether the two claims normally would be tried
together.
Significantly, the cases discussed have involved only one plaintiff. How-
ever, the Third Circuit, in Wilson v. American Chain &¢ Cable Co.,"2 ex-
tended the doctrine to a two-plaintiff situation. Wilson concerned an action
for injuries to a child and for consequential damages sustained by the
father due to the defendant's negligence toward the child. The court of
appeals held that the father's claim was ancillary to the son's claim, and,
under a Pennsylvania statute providing for the combination of actions
of certain related claimants," the two should be litigated together." Citing
Gibbs, the court extended the doctrine to the father's claim, which did not
meet the requisite federal jurisdictional amount, because the two claims
"ordinarily would be tried in one judicial proceeding."" Therefore, the
Third Circuit found Gibbs applicable in a two-plaintiff situation. However,
the Ninth Circuit, in Hymer v. Chai,5 rejected the doctrine in a two-
plaintiff situation."0 The court found pendent jurisdiction applicable to
joinder of claims, not to joinder of parties, and determined that "it was not
designed to permit a party without a federally cognizable claim to invoke
federal jurisdiction by joining a different party plaintiff asserting an inde-
pendent federal claim growing out of the same operative facts.""2 The
court's refusal to follow the Third Circuit's decision in Wilson was based
on a pre-Gibbs case, Kataoka v. May Department Stores,"a where the Ninth
Circuit had held that juristiction could not be conferred over a consortium
claim because both plaintiffs did not have an interest in both claims."s
2t383 U.S. 715 (1966).
'lid. at 725.
23Id.
24 Note, U.M.W. v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1968).
l364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).2
1PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, SS 1621, 1625 (1953). The Pennsylvania statute requires that where
parent and child or husband and wife are claimants, "these two rights of action shall be redressed
in only one suit .... " It should be noted that this statute may have colored other Third Circuit
decisions concerning pendent jurisdiction because of its requirement that certain claims should be
litigated together.
'364 F.2d at 564.28 ld.
2'407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1966).
" One of the claims was for loss of consortium. Id. at 137.
a' Id.
32 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940).
33 id. at 522.
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II. HATRIDGE V. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO.
Relying on the interdependent nature of the two claims involved, the
court in Hatridge applied the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in a two-
plaintiff situation. The court held that where a wife's claim for loss of con-
sortium was contingent upon the success of her husband's claim for per-
sonal injury,' and where the husband's claim exceeded the federal jurisdic-
tional amount, a federal court has jurisdiction over the wife's claim. Gibbs
was cited for general support of the pendent theory, but Gibbs involved
only a single plaintiff. Therefore, the court was required to look to other
circuits for support of the application of the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion in two-plaintiff situations.
In Hatridge the court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit decisions
holding pendent jurisdiction inapplicable to joinder-of-plaintiff cases." It
found apposite, however, the Third Circuit's decision in Wilson. Signifi-
cantly, it appears that Hatridge extends that decision. In Wilson the son's
claim for negligence and the father's claim for consequential damages were
brought in the same suit. The Third Circuit applied pendent jurisdiction
because of the ancillary character of the father's claim to the son's. How-
ever, in Hatridge the wife's claim for loss of consortium was in effect
brought independently of her husband's claim. Because of the prior Bryan
decision in federal court, it was obvious that Mr. Hatridge's claim under
the insurance policy would be denied. The court still felt the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction applicable to the wife's consortium claim. Yet theo-
retically, the husband was not even a claimant in federal court. The hus-
band's appearance was because of his joinder by Aetna as a third-party de-
fendant in Mrs. Hatridge's action, with Aetna additionally bringing a sepa-
rate action for a declaratory judgment under the insurance policy. There-
fore, it would seem that the Eighth Circuit has, in effect, taken the Gibbs
test, which looks to see if the two claims would ordinarily be tried together,
to mean that even if the claims are not brought together, the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction is applicable if they would usually be tried together.
It should be noted that the court considered whether the claim of Mrs.
Hatridge could be said to meet the requisite "matter in controversy.""
Aetna contended, presumably, that the court could look to the monetary
risk of the defendant, and not merely to the amount claimed by the
plaintiff, in order to determine whether the requisite jurisdictional amount
was involved." However, the court rejected this theory because the cases
supporting this view emphasized "the contrasting values as they exist be-
tween the opposing parties in the lawsuit, rather than the overall conse-
"Under Arkansas law a spouse's claim for loss of consortium was derivative of the other
spouse's claim for personal injuries. 415 F.2d at 816.
aa The rejection was based on the Ninth Circuit's reliance in Hymer on a pre-Gibbs decision.
See note 32 supra, and accompanying text.
3628 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1966).
3T See Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1965); Cowell v.
City Water Supply Co., 121 F. 53 (8th Cir. 1903). In these cases the requisite jurisdictional
amount was satisfied by looking to the risk between the opposing parties of the lawsuit, and not
to what the defendant would lose to two claimants.
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